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Abstract 
The ex post analysis of inflation-target fulfillment plays an important role in the inflation- 
-targeting framework. The major benefits of ex post analysis are threefold. First, it improves 
forecast accuracy. Knowledge of the main sources of previous forecast inaccuracies helps 
to better understand the current state of the economy and prevents a central bank from 
producing systematically biased forecasts. Second, it elucidates the abilities and limita-
tions of forecasts used in central-bank decision making. Third, it enhances monetary-po-
licy transparency and credibility. 
The primary aim of the paper is to propose a methodological framework for assessing 
inflation-target fulfillment based on partial simulations, as applied in the Czech National 
Bank. In order to demonstrate the applicability of this framework, we analyze the perfor-
mance of the bank between 2002 and 2006. We show that inflation targeting in this period 
might  have  been  negatively  affected  by  biased  variables  describing  external  develop-
ments.
1. Introduction 
Central banks are increasingly focusing their efforts on improving the transpa-
rency of monetary policy. This trend is reflected by a growing number of central banks 
explicitly announcing their quantitative inflation targets, notwithstanding whether they 
call them selves inflation targeters or not. The existence of explicit target allows a cen-
tral bank to analyse monetary policy performance. For example, Svensson (1997) 
notes: „[...] a specified quantitative target [...] provides an ex post measurement of mo-
netary policy performance, namely realized inflation relative to the inflation target.“ 
The major benefits of ex post analysis of inflation target fulfilment are three-
fold. First, it provides a central bank with a useful tool for a regular check of model 
accuracy and lack of bias. Second, it strengthens the knowledge of shock transmis-
sion  in  the economy  as  described  by  the modeling  apparatus  among  the staff  and 
Board members. Third, publication of a sound analysis of target misses/fulfilment 
might enhance monetary policy transparency and credibility.  
Empirical evidence supports this line of reasoning. For example, Eijffinger and 
Geraats (2002) include a public evaluation of the target fulfilment in the operational 
transparency component of their transparency index.
1 A subsequent study by Demert-
zis and Hallett (2002) used the Eijffinger-Geraats index to estimate the impact of 
1 Beside the public evaluation of target fulfilment (a description of transmission disturbances and the com-
parison of the outcome with central bank objectives) the operational transparency component includes 
discussion of control errors in achieving operating targets. From the sample of nine major central banks,
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transparency on inflation and output variability. One of their conclusions
2 is that ope-
rational transparency significantly reduced inflation variability. 
Despite these benefits of doing and disclosing the assessment, a fear exists of 
being  too  transparent  by  disclosing  such  sensitive  information. S o m e  economists 
(Jensen, 2002) and (Mishkin, 2004) argue that transparency has its own limits and 
that full transparency is less than optimal. Recognition and public announcements of 
central bank mistakes might in their opinion shed doubt on future success of the cen-
tral bank and decrease public confidence in the future fulfilment of the target. Alter-
natively, it is argued that too much transparency in general may bring too much 
attention to the central bank signals and crowd out the signals from the private sector 
– see (Morris, Shin, 2002). Higher transparency then increases rather than decreases 
the economy’s sensitivity to external shocks. On the other hand, some economists 
argue in favour of full transparency (e.g. Blinder (1998) or Chortareas, Stasavage and 
Sterne (2002)). 
We argue that publishing target fulfilment assessment might, if properly com-
municated, further enhance a central bank’s transparency and credibility. Public dis-
closure  reveals  the central  bank’s  ability  for  self-reflection  and  its  willingness  to 
learn from its past mistakes. If the mistakes are not discussed by the bank, they will 
be discussed by journalists and analysts using simple methods and with usually less 
precise and (for the bank) less favourable conclusions. Also, publishing the reasons 
behind meeting/missing central bank objective makes the central bank accountable to 
the public and thus solves the dilemma of the limited accountability of an indepen-
dent central bank. Last, but not least, publishing the analysis may further enhance 
public knowledge of the target and transmission mechanism of the monetary policy, 
especially knowledge of the transmission lag between the central bank’s measures 
and their biggest impact on the economy.  
Section 2 of this paper provides a reader with a detailed overview of current 
practice in evaluating target fulfilment in selected “targeting” central banks. In sec-
tion 3 we propose a methodological framework for the decomposition of inflation de-
viation from the target into underlying economic factors, based on partial simula-
tions. Section 4 summarizes the historical experience of the Czech National Bank with 
this particular way of inflation target assessment. Section 5 presents the conclusion. 
2. Survey of Current Practice in Target Fulfilment Assessment 
In this section we provide an overview of how selected central banks balance 
the pros and cons of target fulfilment assessment and its public disclosure. The coun-
tries in our selection are OECD countries with an explicit target. Out of 19 OECD 
members with an independent monetary policy framework
3, 17 members have an ex-
plicit target and 2 members (Japan and the U.S.) conduct monetary policy without 
any explicit target. With exception of Danmarks Nationalbank, which has a fixed ex-
change rate regime against the euro, all central banks with an explicit target focus 
their attention on inflation. In the rest of this section we describe the assessment of hitt-
2 They also found that higher operational transparency increases output variability. This is probably due to
a transparent central bank’s higher emphasis on the primary target, and fully in line with the Jensen (2002)
findings. 
3OECD countries, which are members of the euro area, are treated in this paper as a single country.  Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                   579 
ing/missing the target in 16 countries with central banks explicitly targeting inflation, 
namely at the Reserve Bank of Australia, Bank of Canada, Czech National Bank, Euro-
pean Central Bank
4, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Central Bank of Iceland, Bank of Korea, 
Banco de México, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Norges Bank, National Bank of 
Poland, Národná Banka Slovenska, Sveriges Riksbank, Swiss National Bank, Central 
Bank of the Republic of Turkey and the Bank of England. 
First we searched through central banks websites for publicly available docu-
ments on the issue of target fulfilment and analysed whether these documents de-
scribe, in detail, the underlying factors behind the target (non)fulfilment and whether 
they explicitly contain the evaluation of monetary policy contribution. Second, we 
sent a questionnaire to each central bank in the sample asking to reveal its internal 
target fulfilment assessment procedures. Subsequently we compared these two sets of 
information and analysed how much the internal documents differ from the officially 
published documents.  
Despite the pronounced transparency of central banks operating in inflation 
targeting regime and despite the key role of inflation target fulfilment in building 
the credibility record, not every central bank in our sample (as of summer 2006) pro-
vides a public analysis of target fulfilment or mentions the role of central bank policy 
in the outcome (see Table 1).  
Four central banks in the sample do not regularly and explicitly compare in-
flationary outcomes with their inflation target (we consider the joined presentation of 
actual inflation and the inflation target in a single paragraph, table or chart to be 
an explicit comparison) or, in the case of the European Central Bank, with its defini-
tion of price stability. In the case of the Narodná Banka Slovenska, the absence of 
the comparison probably stems from the short history of inflation targeting, which 
was adopted in December 2004 with the first target set for December 2005. Aside 
from these four, the central banks confront inflation with the target verbally, graphi-
cally, or numerically. In a majority of banks, this comparison is published both in their 
core annual (Annual Report) and quarterly (Inflation Report, Monthly Bulletin, etc.) 
publications. 
Table 1 shows that if a central bank decides to compare actual inflation with 
the target, it also provides the analysis of the underlying factors behind the inflation 
outcome. A strong tendency seems to exist among the banks to explain the deviation 
from the target, if it is unveiled. This finding is intuitive since the detailed explana-
tion allows the bank to sustain inflation target credibility by blaming the deviation from 
the target fully or partially on factors that are outside the monetary policy control. 
A specific procedure exists in the Bank of England, which only provides a public ex-
planation of the deviation from the target when inflation deviates from the target range 
by more than 1 percentage point. The first (and so far only) letter was sent in April 
2007.  
Interestingly, after excluding the Bank of England, only six banks in our sam-
ple provide a full description of factors behind meeting/missing the target including 
a discussion of monetary policy contribution. These are the Bank of Canada, Bank of 
England, Czech National Bank, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Norges Bank, National Bank 
4 Although ECB officially does not consider itself an inflation targeter, its definition of price stability ful-
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of Poland and the Sveriges Riksbank. Surprisingly, the Reserve Bank of New Zea-
land, despite its high degree of monetary policy transparency does not include an ex-
plicit discussion of monetary policy contribution to target fulfilment in its regular 
publications.  
For some central banks, the cons of revealing the target fulfilment assessment 
to the public might exceed its pros. It is then reasonable to conduct the assessment 
for internal purposes only. In that case, outsiders can hardly find out whether such 
an analysis is being made and what the main sources of target (non)fulfilment are.  
To  unveil  the internal  assessment  procedures,  we  sent  out  a questionnaire  to 
the central banks in our sample, asking them to reveal their internal target fulfilment as-
sessment procedures. Eleven out of 16 central banks have responded (a response rate of 
69 %).
5 Given the confidentiality of the survey answers we will hereafter only discuss 
a summary of the main findings from the survey without citing any particular banks. 
TABLE 1  Publicly Disclosed Analysis of Inflation Target Fulfilment 












in the outcome 
Australia  Reserve Bank of Australia  no yes (SMP)  no
Canada  Bank of Canada  yes (MPR + AR)  yes (MPR + AR)  yes (AR) 
Czech 
Republic  Czech National Bank  yes (IR + AR)  yes (IR + AR)  yes (IR) 
Euro area  European Central Bank  no yes (MB)  no
Hungary  Magyar Nemzeti Bank  yes (IR + AR)  yes (AR)  yes (AR) 
Iceland  Central Bank of Iceland  yes (MB + AR)  yes (MB + AR)  yes
a
Korea  Bank of Korea  yes (MPR + AR)  yes (MPR + AR)  no
Mexico  Banco de México  yes (IR)  yes (IR)  no
New 
Zealand 
Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand  yes (MPS + AR)  yes (MPS)  no
b
Norway  Norges Bank  yes (MPR + AR)  yes (MPR
c + AR) yes (MPR
c + AR) 
Poland  National Bank of Poland  yes (IR + AR)  yes (IR + AR)  yes (IR) 
Slovak 
Republic  Národná Banka Slovenska  no no no
Sweden  Sveriges Riksbank  yes (MPR
d + AR) yes (MPR
d + AR) yes (MPR
d + AR) 
Switzerland  Swiss National Bank  no no no
Turkey  Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey  yes (AR)  yes (AR)  no
United 
Kingdom  Bank of England  yes (IR + AR)  yes
e yes
e
Abbreviations: AR = Annual Report, IR = Inflation Report/Report on Inflation, MB = Monthly Bulletin/Monetary 
Bulletin, MPR = Monetary Policy Report, MPS = Monetary Policy Statement, SMP = Statement 
on Monetary Policy 
Notes:
aIf inflation moves beyond the tolerance limit (currently ± 1.5 percentage point), the Central Bank of Ice-
land is obliged to send a report to the government, explaining the reasons for the deviation from 
the target. 
b Role of moentary policy mentioned occassionally (i.e. Drew and Orr (1999)). 
c published annually in spring issue of Economic Bulletin and February/March issue of MPR 
dannually in first MPR issue 
e If inflation moves away from the target by more than 1 percentage point,  Governor of the Bank is ob-
liged to write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining the reasons behind target missing. 
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Surprisingly, from the 11 banks which sent back the questionnaire, only two 
claim that they do not disclose the target fulfilment analysis to the public in its full 
length. Notably, these two banks use sophisticated modelling techniques for the de-
composition of the overall deviation from the inflation target into its separate under-
lying factors. These banks do not publish all the technical details of the computation 
and the exact results of the simulations, but a verbal description of the main results, 
primarily for sake of clarity.  
If evaluated, the contribution of the central bank monetary policy to the target 
fulfilment is disclosed to the public. However, it must be said that the publicly dis-
closed  evaluation  of  the past  monetary  policy  is  usually  written  in  a rather  general 
manner, without any explicit judgement on the soundness of the past monetary policy. 
Roughly half of the responding central banks employ a modeling technique in 
the target fulfilment assessment, the other half relies rather on expert judgement. If 
a macroeconomic model is used in the assessment, it is in most cases the core model 
used for building the central bank forecast. The main advantages of the application of 
the same model for both tasks are the mutual consistency of the assessment with 
the forecast and the possibility to use the results of the assessment immediately for 
forecast improvement. Indeed, all the banks which use the same modeling technique 
for both assessment and forecasting use the results of the assessment as feedback 
into the forecast and whenever the assessment reveals a systematic bias, a review of 
the model assumptions is initiated. 
On the other hand, the close link between the forecast and assessment implies 
that usually the same staff prepares both the assessment of the target fulfilment and 
the forecast. This is the case in the majority of the central banks in our sample, espe-
cially in the banks which use sophisticated modeling techniques. Then, incentives to 
do some “prejudiced” window dressing might emerge. For example, the staff may 
either intentionally or unintentionally distort the analysis in such a manner as to under-
value the forecast error (for example, by attributing missing the target primarily to 
vis major – external development). But there are ways this problem can be reduced. 
For example, a rewards scheme, based on the improvement of forecast accuracy (not 
on the forecast accuracy itself) might be implemented. 
3. How to Assess Target Fulfilment 
In this section we describe the methodology of the evaluation of target ful-
filment as applied in the CNB. This methodology is based on partial simulations of 
a core  macroeconomic  model.  The CNB's  core  model  is  a New  Keynesian  model 
with forward looking expectations and endogenous monetary policy, more details on 
the CNB's model can be found in (Coats, Laxton, Rose, 2003). 
The use of a model with a monetary policy reaction function provides a con-
sistent framework, which accounts for active monetary policy. On the other hand it 
5 Here I would like to thank all the respondents for valuable feedback, namely: Michal Brzoza-Brzezina 
from the National Bank of Poland, Philippine Cour-Thimann from the European Central Bank, Guy 
Debelle from the Reserve Bank of Australia, Gill Hammond from the Bank of England, Per Jansson from
the Sveriges Riksbank, Per Espen Lilleås from the Bank of Norway, Sharon McCaw from the Bank of
New Zealand, John Murray from the Bank of Canada, Thorarinn Petursson from the Central Bank of
Iceland and Ernesto Sepulveda-Villarreal from the Banco de México. 582                             Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12
makes the analysis more difficult. If monetary policy reacts to exogenous shocks, 
the inflation forecast stays near the inflation target in the longer-term horizon regard-
less of the deviations in other variables. This prohibits us from simulating the impact 
of one variable’s deviation on inflation, because all simulations end up with inflation 
on target. However, the effect of different assumptions can be seen in the monetary 
policy instrument – interest rates. There are two plausible ways for dealing with this 
complication. 
We can “switch off” the reaction function and keep interest rates fixed for 
some period of time. With such a passive policy, the effect of deviation in a given 
variable on inflation is not offset by the central bank’s reaction. Alternatively we can 
simply evaluate the impact of the deviation in a given variable on the interest rate 
trajectory instead of its impact on inflation. Since either way has its shortcomings we 
analyse both of them in the following text, starting with the transitory switching off 
of the reaction function. 
In both  approaches,  the purpose  of  simulations  is  to  explain  the difference 
between the actual inflation and the inflation target: 
target
tt SS           (1) 
where  t S stands for the actual inflation and 
target
t S  for the inflation target.
6 In a fle-
xible targeting framework, the central bank does not have to fully offset the infla-
tionary  impact  of  an economic  shock.  Hence,  part  of  the difference  (1)  might  be 
explained either by calling escape clauses into effect or by smoothing the interest rate 
trajectory.  Both  explanations  should  be  already  incorporated  in t he forecast  upon 
the central bank, decided n-time periods ago, when the central bank was influencing 
inflation in time t:
               
_ (, )
target escape clauses smoothing
tt tt n t tn tn EE x E i r SS S S H H                    (2) 
where  tn t E S  stands for the inflation forecast, made n-time periods ago, a time hori-
zon  corresponding  to  the lag  in  the monetary  policy  transmission.  x d e notes  exo-
genous  variables  (from  model perspective  input variables),  ir i nterest  rates  and 
the tn E  operator their expected behaviour. 
_ escape clauses H  specifies the intentional miss-
ing of  the target  as  ex  ante explained by escape  clauses  and 
smoothing H  a s  t h e in-
tentional  missing  of  the target  explained  by  interest  rate  smoothing.  Values  of 
_ escape clauses H and
smoothing H  are known at the time when the forecast is being made 
and the equation (2) should always hold for consistency reasons. This becomes evi-
dent when we subtract the actual inflation from both sides of the equation (2) and 
rewrite:
      
_ (, )
escape clauses smoothing target
tnt tn tn t EE x E i r HH S S            (2´) 
We can analyse these two factors of missing the target in more depth either 
jointly or separately. If we opt for the separate analysis, we can obtain the contri-
bution of the escape clause application by running the simulation with the assump-
6 Here we assume that the inflation target is either a point target or a range target with a midpoint. If
the target is set as a range without a midpoint, it is reasonable to use the middle of a range as a benchmark. Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                   583 
tion that the central bank reacts to overall inflation development and not to a part of 
it, as in the case of the escape clause application. The contribution of smoothing is 
then easily obtained as a complement. 
Having described intentional target missing, we can go further and break down 
the right-hand side of equation (2), unexplained by escape clauses and smoothing, as 
follows:  
' (, ) (, )
model_change
tt n t t n t n tt n t t n t n EE x E i r EE x E i r SS SS H               (3) 
where 
' (, ) tnt tn tn EE x E i r S   stands for the inflation forecast, as if it were made in 
time t-n using the latest model specification, i.e. using today’s knowledge of the func-
tioning of the economy, but with the original forecast’s assumptions on exogenous 
variables  and  nominal  interest  rates.  Equation  (3)  then  compares  the missing  of 
the target using the historical model specification and the missing of the target when 
the latest model specification is applied. 
model_change  H stands for the part of the miss-
ing  of  the target  explained  by  the changes  in  the model  specification  and  impro-
vements in the understanding of the economy since the original forecast formulation.  
Again, equation (3) can be rewritten into: 
        
' (, ) (, )
model_change
tn t tn tn tn t tn tn EE x E i r EE x E i r HS S       (3´) 
The  right-hand  side  of  the equation  (3),  unexplained  by  the model  specifi-
cation improvement, can be further decomposed into: 
         
'' (, ) ( , )
exogenous
tt n t t ntn t tn t tn EE x E i r Ex E i r SS SS H              (4) 
where x denotes the actual development of the exogenous variables in the model and 
exogenous H  the part of the missing of the target assigned to the deviation of actual exo-
genous variables´ development from the original assumptions of the forecast. Again, 
for the purpose of better visualisation we rewrite the equation (4) into: 
          
'' (, ) ( , )
exogenous
tn t tn tn t tn tn Ex E i r EEx Ei r HS S             (4´) 
The simulation 
' (, ) tn t tn Ex E i r S   is done using the present model specifica-
tion,  the actual  exogenous  variable  development  and  the original  interest  rate  tra-
jectory.  
Subsequently, the right-hand side of the equation (4), unexplained by the devia-
tion of actual exogenous variables from the assumptions, can be rewritten into: 
          
'' (, ) (, )
monetary_policy
tt n t t n tt n t Ex E i r Ex i r SS SS H              (5) 
where ir stands for the actual development of interest rates and 
_ monetary policy H  for 
the part of missing the target explained by the deviation of the actual interest rate 
development from the original recommendation of the model. Rewriting the equation 
(5) we get: 
                  
'' (, ) (, )
monetary_policy
tn t tn t tn Ex i r Ex E i r HS S           (5´) 584                             Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12
The simulation 
' (, ) tn t Ex i r S   is obtained by running the simulation with the latest 
model specification, the actual exogenous variables´ development and the actual in-
terest rate development. 
Finally, the right-hand side of equation (5), unexplained by the deviation of 
actual  interest  rates  development  from  the assumptions,  is  labelled  as  model  in-
accuracy:
       
' (, )
model_inaccuracy
tt n t Ex i r HS S             (6) 
More precisely, 
model_inaccurancy H  is the part of the missing of the target, unex-
plained by previous simulations. This term captures both the inaccuracy of the pre-
sent model, the inaccuracy of the simulations and the inaccuracy of the data. 
It must be said that the approach of partial simulations presented here is con-
ditional on several simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that historical data, as 
published for example by the statistical office, are perfect measures of reality. Se-
cond, we treat historically observed shocks as expected in simulations. Third, we 
consider the latest version of the model as the best available description of reality. 
We should carefully bear these assumptions in mind especially when interpreting 
the last part of the missing of the target as defined by equation (6).  
Solving equations (2) to (6) we get: 
               
_
_
target escape clauses smoothing model_change
tt
exogenous monetary policy model_inaccurancy
SS H H H
HH H
    
 
          (7) 
While the first two terms on the right-hand side describe the intentional miss-
ing  of  the target,  the remaining  terms  should be considered  as  the unintentional 
missing of the target. The aim of the central bank should be to minimize the extent of 
the unintentional  missing  of  the target,  i.e.  the values  of 
model_change  H ,
exogenous H ,
_ monetary policy H  and 
model_inaccurancy H .
Some central banks, including the CNB, when forecasting exogenous varia-
bles mechanically draw on the consensual forecasts of independent economists. In 
that case, the central bank is not directly responsible for the 
exogenous H  term, and the fo-
recasting team should only be held responsible for 
model_change  H  and 
model_inaccurancy H .
model_change  H  is the disclosed part of the model inaccuracy, while 
model_inaccurancy H  is 
the undisclosed part. It is reasonable to assume that the forecasting team gradually 
improves the forecasting techniques, so non-zero values of 
model_change  H consequently 
reduce the values of 
model_inaccurancy H . If the forecast was based on the internally made 
assumptions regarding exogenous variables, the forecasting team should also be res-
ponsible for the value of 
exogenous H .
It  is  the role  of  the decision-making  body  of  the central  bank  (monetary 
policy committee, banking board) to identify the risks of the forecast and to choose 
the 
_ monetary policy H  that offsets the inaccuracy of the forecast and minimizes the over-
all sum of 
model_change  H ,
exogenous H ,
_ monetary policy H  and 
model_inaccurancy H , i.e. the future Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                   585 
unintentional deviation of inflation from  the target. In an ideal case, the decision- 
-making body should fully compensate for forecast inaccuracy: 
      
_ ()
monetary policy model_change exogenous model_inaccurancy HH H H            (8) 
However,  equation  (8)  does  not  hold  if  the decision  maker  has  changed 
the perception of optimal interest rate smoothing or the perception and application of 
escape clauses since the original forecast completion. To differentiate between the ef-
fect of risk assessment and the effects of changes in monetary policy behaviour, one 
must carefully read the minutes from the decision body’s meetings and identify 
the overall risk assessment. 
A similar approach might be adopted in central banks that use, in their decision- 
-making, models with exogenous monetary policy, which are based on the assump- 
tion of unchanged interest rates or interest rates fixed on a predefined trajectory.
7 As-
suming fixed interest rates, the forecast is usually outside the inflation target in the mo-
netary policy horizon. Writing from an ex post perspective: 
(, )
target fixed_ir
tt tt n t t n Ei r E x SS S S H              (9) 
where  (, ) tnt tn Ei r E x S  stands for the inflation forecast, based on the assumption of 
interest rates fixed on a predefined trajectory  ir  and 
fixed_ir H  stands for the diver-
gence of the forecast from the target, caused by non-reactive monetary policy. In this 
case, the monetary authority must decide not only the bias in the inflation forecast 
caused by model inaccuracy and by exogenous variable development, but also on 
the bias in the forecast caused by adhering to the assumption of fixed interest rates, 
fixed_ir H :
           
_ ()
monetary policy fixed_ir model_change  exogenous model_inaccurancy HH H H H            (10) 
The aforementioned procedure of target assessment with a temporarily switch-
ed-off reaction function or with exogenous monetary policy is rather tricky. Besides 
vulnerability to the Lucas critique,
8 exogenising the interest rate trajectory brings ad-
ditional complications to our analysis. It is obvious that the economy will diverge 
from a reasonable path without the stabilising effect of monetary policy. As a con-
sequence, some simulations might result in large deviations from the steady state and 
might be difficult to interpret. These arguments lead us to recommend the use of a mo-
del with endogenous monetary policy and a target fulfilment analysis based on simu-
lations with a switched-on reaction function. In this approach, the impact of each factor 
on the target fulfilment is derived from a comparison of the implied interest rates. 
Following the same logic as in equations (2)–(6) in the previous approach, we 
can break down the difference between the actual interest rates and the interest rates 
consistent with the target fulfilment in the following way: 
       
__ _ () () KK        
inflation  in  target   escape clauses smoothing
tn tn tn tn ir E ir E x ir E ir E x     (11) 
7 For example, forecasts of the Bank of England and the ECB are based on interest rate trajectories derived
from the market yield curves. 
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or, if rewritten: 
__ _ () () KK      
escape clauses smoothing inflation in target 
tn tn tn tn Ei r Ex Ei r Ex         (11´) 
where ir denotes the actual development of interest rates,  ()
inflation intarget 
tn tn Ei r Ex 
refers  to  the interest  rate  trajectory  which  will  keep  inflation  in  the target,  given 
the expected development of exogenous variables x. Similarly to (2), we can break 
down the first two components of the right-hand side of equation (11), unexplained 
by escape clauses and smoothing, as follows: 
' () ()
model_change
tn tn tn tn ir E ir E x ir E ir E x K                        (12) 
or: 
                     
' () ()
model_change
tn tn tn tn Ei r Ex Ei r Ex K     (12´) 
Further breakdown will disclose the impact of the deviation of the actual exo-
genous variables´ development from the original assumptions of the forecast: 
     
'' () ( )
exogenous
tn tn tn ir E ir E x ir E ir x K             (13) 
or: 
      
'' () ( )
exogenous
tn tn tn Ei r x Ei r Ex K          (13´) 
And finally, the right-hand side of the equation (13), unexplained by the de-
viation of the actual exogenous variables´  development from the original assump-
tions of the forecast, is labelled model inaccuracy: 
            
' ()
model_inaccuracy
tn ir E ir x K          (14) 
In contrast to (6), the model inaccuracy term in equation (14) also contains 
inaccuracy in forecasting monetary policy reaction, which is not treated separately 
from other endogenous variables in simulations with a switched-on reaction func-
tion.
It is easily seen that the sum of error terms in equations (11)–(14) is equal to 
the total deviation of actual interest rates from the trajectory consistent with target 
fulfilment: 





    
 
inflation in target escape clauses smoothing
tn tn
model_change exogenous model inaccurancy
ir E ir E x
     (15) 
The  main  shortcoming  of  the approach  based  upon  a switched-on  reac- 
tion  function  is  the impossibility  to  determine  the extent  in  which  the decision- 
-making  body  anticipated  the model  inaccuracy  and  the contribution  of  the risk 
assessment to the inflation outcome. Another problem stems from the necessity to 
analyse the whole trajectory of interest rates from period t-n to period t (mainly due 
to interest rate smoothing, which melts the central bank reaction into several quar-
ters).
In section 4, we show an example of the target fulfilment assessment based 
on the switched-on reaction function approach, as applied in the Czech National 
Bank.  Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12                                   587 
4. Example of the Target Fulfilment Assessment – CNB’s Historical Record 
The Czech National Bank started assessing inflation target fulfilment  with 
the introduction of inflation targeting in 1998. Until 2001, targets were only set for 
year-end and the inflation target fulfilment assessment was made on an annual basis 
and published each year in the January Inflation Report. Starting from 2002, a con-
tinuous  target  has  been  introduced  and  inflation  target  assessment  has  become 
an integral part of every issue of the Inflation Report (chapter II.2 of the Report).  
Until July 2002, the CNB forecast was based on the assumption of constant 
interest rates and expert judgement played a key role in shaping the forecast. As a con-
sequence, the inflation target fulfilment assessment was mostly judgemental until 
the third quarter of 2003 (the October 2003 Inflation Report).
9 Starting from the Ja-
nuary  2004  Inflation  Report,  the regular  assessment  stands  upon s imulations  of 
the model with endogenous monetary policy. 
Eleven assessments were made from January 2004 to July 2006 using the ap-
proach described in section 3 with a switched-on reaction function. As previously 
discussed, in this approach we discuss interest rate residuals rather than inflation re-
siduals. In all assessments, the following effects were identified: (i) the intentional 
missing of the target (
_ escape clauses smoothing KK  ), (ii) the effect of the external envi-
ronment (
exogenous K ), (iii) the effect of model change (
_ K
model change ) and (iv) the ef-
fect of model inaccuracy (
_ K
model inaccurancy  ). Starting from the first quarter of 2004, 
the assessment has been extended for (v) the effect of regulated prices and changes in 
consumption taxes (lets denote this effect by 
regulated_prices K ), and finally, starting from 
the second  quarter  of  2005  the assessment  also  includes  (vi) the effect  of  the de-




Figure 1 and 2 shows the inflation and interest rates forecasts from the CNB’s 
model  with  endogenous  monetary  policy  together  with  the actual  outcomes.  Al-
though the forecasts are in practice made for an infinite horizon, only the first six 
quarters which correspond to the monetary policy horizon of the CNB are depicted in 
the charts. Several observations can be made from Figure 1. First, the actual inflation 
was in the majority of the forecasts below the forecasted values. Out of eleven fore-
casts in the sample, three (July 2003, January 2004, January 2005) almost matched 
the ex post outcomes and one (October 2003) stood below the actual inflation for 
the significant part of the forecast. This finding is consistent with the series of nega-
tive exogenous shocks in the sample period (the prolonged recession in Germany, 
low pace of price deregulation, exceptionally good harvest in 2004 and 2005), whose 
disinflationary impact on the inflation was only partially offset by the unexpectedly 
high oil prices. The second observation is that, with the only exception of the April 
2003 forecast, inflation forecasts tend to return to the inflation target in the longer 
horizon. This reflects the nature of the forecasts with endogenous monetary policy, 
which in a sufficiently long time horizon pushes the inflation forecast close to the tar-
get. Only the April 2003 forecast significantly departed from this rule in the moneta- 
9 The monetary policy horizon of the CNB is between twelve and eighteen months. 588                             Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 11-12
ry policy horizon because of the temporary effect of expected adjustments in con-
sumption taxes, which were treated by escape clauses. 
The interest rate forecasts, presented in Figure 2, provide a similar picture. 
The majority  of  forecasts  exceeded  the outcome  in  the longer  horizon.  Forecasts 
between July 2003 and January 2004 break this rule, which in the case of the October 
2003 forecast intuitively corresponds to the bias in the inflation forecast. From a po-
licy-maker perspective interest rate forecasts, as opposed to the inflation forecasts, 
are most important in the short-term horizon, where they have an immediate effect on 
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the decision-making. In the short-term horizon the accuracy of interest rate forecasts 
is significantly higher than in the longer-term horizon. This can be partially explained 
by interest rate smoothing and partially by the self-fulfilment of the interest rate as-
sumption. In the sample, CNB’s banking board usually followed the forecast recom-
mendation, with October 2002, April 2003, October 2003 and April 2004 exceptions. 
The second observation in Figure 2, parallel to the second finding in the pre-
vious chart, is that the interest rate path is usually upward-sloping in the longer horizon. 
This is a result of model assumption that in the sufficiently distant future interest rates 
will converge to their equilibrium values (defined as the equilibrium real interest rate 
plus  the inflation  target,  approximately  5 %  in  the sample)  and i n i tial  interest  rates 
uniformly lying below their long-run equilibrium values in the sample period. 
The charts above may serve as a good illustration of the basic features of 
the CNB’s forecasts and as a first insight into the economic development in the ana-
lysed period, but they cannot tell us which particular factor made reality deviate from 
the forecast and whether the modeling apparatus is sufficiently accurate or not. Based 
on these figures, it is impossible to judge whether the forecasting techniques or mo-
netary policy can be improved and in which direction. In order to reach answers to 
these questions we provide, in the following paragraphs, the results of the partial si-
mulations prepared in the sample period. 
Figures  3–8 d e p i c t  the values  of 






fiscal impulse and 
_ K
model inaccurancy . As mentioned earlier, 
regulated_prices K  values are available since the 2004 Q1 assessment and 
_ K
fiscal  impulse
values since the 2005 Q2 assessment. 
Figure 3 shows that CNB quite often does not aim exactly at the middle of 
the inflation  target  in  the monetary  policy  horizon (the  situation  corresponding  to 
the zero line). Within the sample, three inflation forecasts (January 2003, April 2004 
and July 2004) stood on the target. Consistent with this, the interest rate trajectory in 
these forecasts was the same as the interest rate trajectory necessary for achieving 
the target, i.e. the 
_ escape clausess m oothing KK   residual was zero. In the rest of forecasts, 
either the smoothing of interest rates or ex ante escape clauses made the CNB deviate 
interest rates from the trajectory consistent with inflation target fulfilment.
10 In most 
forecasts, meeting the target would require a lower initial interest rate than the sug- 
FIGURE 3  
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gested baseline scenario (positive residuals in Figure 3). However, after already three 
quarters a more aggressive rule pushes interest rates above the original forecast in 
order to compensate for the previous easing of the monetary policy. The April 2003 
forecast was the only forecast predicting inflation above the target in the monetary 
policy horizon (see Figure 1). In this case, meeting the target would require higher 
interest rates for all six quarters. 
Figure 4 captures the effects of changes in the model specification. Since the in-
troduction of the New Keynesian model with endogenous monetary policy in sum-
mer 2002, several improvements in the modelling techniques have been made.
11
These  changes  acted  in  the direction  of  higher  inflation  and  interest  rates  with 
the only  exception  of  the October  2004  forecast  assessment,  based  on  the model 
specification as in January 2006. 
The effect of the external environment is depicted in Figure 5. The interest 
rate trajectory with ex post knowledge of external developments lies uniformly below 
the interest rate forecasts based on ex ante expectation until the July 2004 forecast. 
This reflects the disinflationary effect of the external environment (especially of fo-
reign demand as represented by the German output gap) on the Czech economy be-
tween 2002 and 2004. However, the inflationary effects of the pronounced rise of oil 
prices in 2005 and 2006 outweighed the weak foreign demand in the October 2004 
and January 2005 forecast. Figure 5 exhibits the average highest absolute values 
from Figures 3–8, implying that external factors explain the biggest part of inflation 
FIGURE 4  
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10 Theoretically, an infinite number of interest rate trajectories exist which would lead to the inflation
forecast at the target. In our simulations we have derived the hypothetical interest rate trajectories by
increasing the aggressiveness of the reaction function, i.e. by increasing the weight on inflation in the re-
action function and, if necessary, also by lowering the smoothing parameter. 
11 The most important adjustments have been abandoning the assumption of the price rigidity of some
items of the consumer basket in April 2003 and the gradual lowering of the estimated rate of equilibrium
appreciation of the Czech crown’s exchange rate in July and October 2003 and January 2004. In the Ja-
nuary 2005 and in the 2006 forecasts the equilibrium appreciation was increased. The other changes to 
the model, including the break-up of the single Phillips curve into two separate equations for food prices
and core inflation in October 2002, the recalibration of the central bank’s reaction function in April 2003,
the inclusion of the EUR/USD exchange rate in the import price equation in April 2004, the decomposition
of equilibrium exchange rate appreciation between tradables and non-tradables in October 2005 and
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deviation from the target. This finding clearly illustrates the vulnerability of the Czech 
economy to external developments. 
The effect of the deviation of regulated prices and adjustments in taxes from 
the original assumptions is presented in Figure 6. Although some of the forecasts in 
the sample predicted a significantly different development of administrative prices 
than subsequently turned up (noticeable in the April 2003 forecast), the average de-
viation of the forecasts is close to zero. One should note here that these simulations 
include both the primary and secondary effects of regulated prices changes (if their 
contribution to overall inflation is “normal”
12) and only the secondary effects of tax 
changes. Primary effects of tax changes and the “abnormal” contribution of regulated 
prices to inflation are included in the simulation of escape clause effects.  
Figure 7 shows the effect of the deviation of the fiscal impulse from the ori-
ginal assumptions. Only five forecasts are depicted in this chart because this factor 
was not treated separately until the January 2004 forecast (before that it was included 
in the model inaccuracy effect). Having this limited number of observations it is dif-
ficult  to  identify  any  systematic  pattern.  However,  all  observations  have  been  in 
the negative region, i.e. the CNB tended to overestimate the fiscal impulse in its fore 
FIGURE 5  
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casts. This might look like a sign of central bank vigilance, but the real reason is more 
prosaic. The Czech government systematically overestimated its budget deficits in 
the sample period and central bank forecasts, despite some discounting of official 
budget plans, have been influenced in the direction of higher fiscal impulses.  
Finally, Figure 8 captures the remaining residuals of the forecasts, unexplain-
ed by previous simulations. Among these, a prominent role should be assigned to 
the central bank reaction function residual, as discussed in section 3. The banking 
board might disagree with the forecast message and might assign asymmetric risks to 
the baseline  scenario  of  the forecast.  In  an ideal  case,  this  risk  identification  will 
anticipate the future deviation of the economy from the forecast, so the deviation of 
interest rates from the forecast will keep the inflation in line with the forecast. How-
ever, the identified risks are only rarely fully realised in the anticipated extent and it 
would be useful to distinguish between ex post appropriate risk identification (cor-
responding to model inaccuracy) and ex post inappropriate risk identification (in-
terest changes beyond model inaccuracy). But as we mentioned in section 3, this is 
not possible using simulation with a switched-on reaction function. Hence, we have 
to limit our discussion of Figure 8 to the overall bias of the model, including the ef-
fect of risk assessment. 
Although residuals in Figure 8 are on average balanced, three specific pe-
riods might be identified. For the first two forecasts, the residuals are balanced and 
FIGURE 7  
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close to zero. In the second period, beginning with the January 2003 forecast, the re-
siduals lie significantly above the zero line, i.e. the actual interest rates were higher 
than the model would suggest, based on the perfect knowledge of all relevant in-
formation. Starting from the April 2004 forecast the sign of residuals turned around 
and became mostly negative. The differences between the residuals in these three pe-
riods might be either the result of a shift in the risk evaluation, changes in the fo-
recasting techniques that were not captured in the previous simulations
13 or the result 
of changes in the functioning of the economy.  
Whereas it is impossible in our approach to discriminate between the last two 
hypotheses, we can try to verify the first hypothesis by looking at the overall balance 
of the risks, as recorded in the minutes from the decision-making meeting, and by 
comparing this finding with the actual setting of interest rates. In the first period, 
risks were slightly disinflationary (the July 2002 forecast) or balanced (the October 
2002 forecast). Risks in the second period were predominantly inflationary (the Ja-
nuary 2003, October 2003 and January 2004 forecasts), the July 2003 forecast was 
assessed as balanced and the April 2003 forecast as disinflationary. On the contrary, 
risks in the third period were mostly biased in the disinflationary direction (the April 
2004, January 2005 forecasts), the balanced risks were identified for the July 2004 
and October 2004 forecasts. Based on this information we can conclude that the bias in 
the residuals in each specific period corresponds to the overall direction of the risks, as 
identified by the board. We can conclude that the residuals in Figure 8 are at least 
partially influenced by the bias in the risk assessment. 
To sum up, our analysis based on the partial simulations shows that a large 
part  of  missing  the target  in  the period  under  review  came  from a   d e v i a tion  in 
the input variables (predominantly from the external environment). We also show that 
in the context of the model with endogenous monetary policy, some part of the model 
inaccuracy,  as  expressed  by  the deviation  of  the actual  interest  rates  from  the re-
commendation  of  the model  with  full  knowledge,  might  be  assigned  to  the risk 
assessment of the board. 
5. Conclusions 
The assessment of target fulfilment is an essential part of a monetary policy 
framework  with  an explicit  target.  It  prevents  a central  bank  from  producing  sy-
stematically biased forecasts, deepens the central bank staff’s and board members’ 
understanding of the abilities and limitations of the forecast and enhances monetary 
policy transparency and credibility. We argue in favour of publishing the analysis.  
Indeed, our survey shows that the majority of central banks armed with an ex-
plicit inflation target provide the public with detailed ex post analyses of inflation 
target fulfilment, either on a regular or irregular basis. However, some central banks 
still do not even compare inflation outcomes with the target. 
Subsequently we propose a possible approach to identifying the underlying 
reasons  behind  hitting/missing  the inflation  target  based  on  partial  simulations  of 
the reduced-form model. We distinguish between models with endogenous and exo-
genous monetary policy and propose procedures for quantifying the contribution of 
13 These might include, for example, shifts in the expert judgement, which strongly affects forecast in 
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risk assessment to the outcome. The procedure with endogenous monetary policy is 
applied to the Czech National Bank’s forecasts between 2002 and 2005. 
In this period, inflation forecasts and interest rate forecasts were biased up-
wards and inflation was most of time below the target. A detailed assessment of the in-
flation target fulfilment reveals that a large part of the bias in the forecasts might be 
assigned  to  the bias  in  variables  describing  external  development  and t h a t  s o m e  
short-lived deviations of interest rates from the model recommendation might be ex-
plained by the board’s asymmetric risk assessment. 
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